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Prose Comprehension Skills
Abstract
This paper reviews the experimental investigations of children's prose
comprehension, with special emphasis on the development of skills necessary
for reading comprehension. The research is discussed under four major
headings, corresponding to specific comprehension skills: identifying
main ideas, understanding logical structure, making inferences, and using
higher order knowledge structures (e.g. the story schema). A preliminary
section of the paper deals with some of the measurement problems inherent
in comprehension research. The paper concludes with a consideration of
the research implications for reading comprehension instruction.
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The Development of Prose Comprehension Skills
In view of the tremendous role that reading plays in most of our lives,
we know amazingly little about the processes involved in reading comprehen-
sion. Though this paucity of knowledge may seem surprising, it becomes more
understandable when we consider how complex comprehension really is. Com-
prehension of prose, whether written or oral, involves considerably more
than understanding the meanings of individual words and sentences; it also
requires that one understand how the ideas expressed in one sentence are
related to ideas expressed in other sentences. An even more critical com-
ponent of comprehension is the knowledge that one brings to the reading
situation; in fact, the same passage may be understood in different ways
depending on a reader's background. Thus, comprehension involves a complex
interplay between the reader and the material.
It is only within the past decade that comprehension has gained wide-
spread attention as a domain of study. Most of the research has focused on
adult subjects in order to investigate the comprehension process in mature
readers. (See Goetz, in press, and Reder, in press, for reviews of this
literature.) Several of the adult findings have stimulated experiments on
the development of comprehension, and these developmental experiments will
be reviewed in this chapter. The main thrust of the research thus far has
been to document the comprehension skills possessed by children of various
ages and the changes these skills undergo with age. This information is
clearly important to a developmental psychologist, but its value to a reading
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educator is more nebulous. The research demonstrates when one might expect
certain skills to develop, but it does not provide much insight into how
they develop. Though the latter is certainly a critical question to all
those interested in comprehension, the research efforts are not yet suf-
ficiently mature to provide the answers. Thus, many of the studies may
seem of tangential relevance to reading comprehension instruction. Never-
theless, we feel that because the research has bearing on the development
of comprehension, it is, in fact, of practical value. We will discuss
these practical implications in the concluding section of the chapter.
In searching for a framework within which to organize our review, we
observed that most studies addressed specific skills that contribute to
comprehension instead of treating comprehension as a global process. The
four most commonly explored skills were identifying main ideas, understand-
ing logical structure, making inferences, and using higher order knowledge
structures (most studies have focused on knowledge about the structure of
stories). A concern with these four skills is also apparent in comprehen-
sion instruction. Typical workbook exercises for beginning readers include
finding main ideas, unscrambling sentences in a passage so that it makes
sense, making inferences about story characters, and making up or completing
stories. Research relevant to each of these skills will be discussed in turn,
but the classification is primarily an expository convenience because the
skills are highly interdependent. Moreover, we are not suggesting that these
are the only skills involved in comprehension nor that they should be studied
or taught in isolation.
Prose Comprehension Skills
Some Preliminary Comments on Measuring Comprehension
One of the more difficult problems associated with comprehension re-
search is the choice of an appropriate method for assessment. Just as no
one is quite satisfied with existing reading comprehension tests in the
schools, so no one is quite satisfied with current experimental method-
ology for testing comprehension. This problem has been discussed at
length elsewhere (e.g., Carroll, 1972; Farr, 1969; Greeno, 1977), but a
few comments are in order to acquaint the reader with the techniques that
have been used in the research we will be discussing. There are countless
variations on the definition of comprehension, and needless to say, the way
it is defined influences the way it is measured. Nevertheless, the differ-
ent definitions share enough common features that comparisons among experi-
ments are meaningful.
Virtually all of the measures of comprehension that experimenters have
adopted impose some sort of memory demand on the subjects. Rather than
testing for comprehension in the presence of the reading material, as do
many standardized tests, experimenters typically present the material,
remove it, and then test for memory. The most common memory tests are
free recall, probed recall, and recognition. Free recall tests require
the subject to produce everything that can be remembered about the material.
Such tests are similar to essay questions students receive on exams. Probed
recall tests require the subject to provide specific information about the
material, and are often in the form of "wh" questions. These tests are
analogous to short-answer exam questions. Recognition tests require the
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subject to discriminate statements that are identical to or consistent with
the studied passage from related alternatives. Such "objective" tests
correspond to the multiple choice or true/false items often found on stan-
dardized tests.
The rationale for using memory tests as an index of comprehension is
that poorly understood material will not be well-remembered. (Unless it is
rotely memorized; i.e., many children can recite the Pledge of Allegience
but do not comprehend it.) This rationale received empirical support in
studies by Bransford and Johnson (1972) and Thorndyke (1977) where a close
relationship was found between the amount of information recalled from a
passage and ratings of its comprehensibility. However, one should be
cautious in concluding that something has not been understood because it
was not remembered. A reader may have good comprehension during reading,
but may not be able to remember the material later. Moreover, memory tests
of comprehension are plagued with the possibility of a production or response
bias. That is, the index of comprehension is based only on the subjects'
overt responses; it is possible that something will be comprehended at the
time of reading, and remembered at the time of testing, but excluded in the
subject's response. Suppose, for example, that you read a story about three
little boys named Steve, Mike, and Alan. You are told that Steve is the
oldest, Alan is the youngest, and Mike is wearing a blue shirt. On a recall
test you might well state that Steve is the oldest and Alan the youngest.
But you might leave out the inference that Mike's age is somewhere between
that of Steve's and Alan's. You might have left this out because you thought
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it obvious, or perhaps because you thought your answer should include only
explicitly stated information. Similarly, you might leave out the fact that
Mike was wearing a blue shirt because, although you remembered it, the fact
seemed trivial and not worth mentioning. As this example demonstrates,
recall tests often provide a faulty index of comprehension, since subjects
are free to decide how much and what information to include. This problem
is better controlled in probed recall and recognition tests, but recogni-
tion tests introduce another bias problem associated with response criteria
(Coombs, Dawes, & Tversky, 1970).
One way to circumvent the potential discrepancy between what the tester
wants and what the reader recalls is to demand verbatim recall (i.e., asking
the subject to recall the exact words of the passage). Most people agree
that this is too stringent a requirement and so subjects are usually
allowed to recall in their own words. However, experimenters often estab-
lish highly subjective criteria in scoring for "gist" recall. In view of
this problem, several researchers have developed models for representing
the semantic content of a passage (e.g., Crothers, 1972; Fredericksen, 1972;
Kintsch, 1974; Meyer, 1975). Since the models represent concepts rather
than individual words, paraphrases and synonym substitutions are permissible
in recall. The models have not been widely adopted by experimenters, how-
ever, because of their complexity. A second type of model that can assist
in scoring decisions is the "story grammar" (Mandler & Johnson, 1977;
Rumelhart, 1975; Stein & Glenn, 1978, Thorndyke, 1977), which will be
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discussed in the final section of the chapter. This model, however, is
applicable only to a limited class of prose materials: the story.
The major point we wish to communicate is that there is no way to
get a complete, unbiased picture of what has been comprehended. However,
by using a variety of test procedures, we can hope to obtain a reasonably
accurate idea of what the reader has taken away from his or her inter-
action with a text.
When studying the development of comprehension, additional .actors
must be taken into consideration. For example, if we want to compare
differences in comprehension skills among kindergarten, second, and fourth
graders, it makes little sense to ask them to read a passage because the
older children can read better than the younger. Thus, in order to avoid
confounding differences in decoding ability with differences in compre-
hension, passages are often presented orally rather than in written form.
Another way to avoid this problem is to present narratives in picture for-
mat rather than verbal; this approach has the added advantage of sustain-
ing the child's interest level. While there is reason to believe that
medium of presentation may affect comprehension (Schallert, Kleiman, &
Rubin, 1977), this will not be a focus of our review.
A second problem specific to developmental research is that older
children generally remember more information than younger. However, this
does not necessarily mean that they comprehended the material better. A
number of additional factors contribute to this improved performance on
memory tasks, such as improved mnemonic or study strategies, and more
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familiarity with testing procedures and task demands. Thus, we should
expect to find differences in the amount of information that is recalled
by children of various ages; such an outcome is of little theoretical
interest or practical value. What is of interest is whether or not manipu-
lations of a particular variable have differential effects as a function of
age. For example, it is not very informative to find that older children
recalled more from a passage than younger; it is informative to know that
the difference was greater when the passage was presented in a disorganized
format than in an organized format. Such an outcome would indicate develop-
mental differences in the ability to deal with disruptions in logical
sequence.
Identifying Main Ideas
Reading comprehension tests abound with questions requiring identifi-
cation of main ideas. The frequency with which such "main idea" exercises
are given to beginning readers is evidence that this skill is regarded as
an important component of reading comprehension. Experimental investiga-
tions of children's understanding of main ideas have used three general
approaches. One approach simply tests for recall of a passage and examines
the relative incidence of main ideas in the recall protocols (e.g., Binet &
Henri, 1898; Christie & Schumacher, 1975; Korman, 1945, cited in Yendovitskayz,
1971). A second approach is to present children with a passage and ask them
to classify the information as to its importance level (Brown & Smiley,
1977). The third approach is to ask children to describe the main idea of
a passage in their own words (e.g., Danner, 1976; Mal'tseva, cited in
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Smirnov, Istomina, Mal'tseva, & Samokhvalova, 1971-72; Otto, Barrett, &
Koenke, 1969).
An early study using the recall approach was carried out by Binet and
Henri (1894; excerpted translation in Thieman & Brewer, 1978). Children
ranging in age from 9-12 listened to short prose passages of varying
lengths and then recalled them. Binet and Henri reported that important
ideas were remembered better than less important ideas by children of
all ages. In another early study, (Korman, 1945; cited in Yendovitskayz,
1971), children of 4, 5, and 6 years listened to fairy tales and then
recalled them. Again, ideas which were related to the theme of the story
were more frequently recalled than those which were less related.
A problem common to both studies was that the criteria for deciding
the relative importance of ideas were not well specified. The authors pre-
sumably used their intuitions to identify the important elements, and it is
not clear how much agreement there would be if different opinions were
obtained. A more recent study by Christie and Schumacher (1975) attempted
to take this problem into account. The authors constructed a 420-word
passage that could be divided into 30 "idea units." College students were
asked to select the 15 ideas which were most relevant to the theme, and
the 15 which were least relevant. The passage was presented on tape to
kindergarten, second, and fifth graders who were later asked to recall it.
Again, recall was better for ideas judged theme relevant than theme-
irrelevant.
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Although these results suggest that even kindergarteners are able to
differentiate the main ideas from the details of a fairly complex story,
this conclusion is suspect. Inspection of the story reveals that the theme-
irrelevant ideas were not simply details; they were deliberately introduced
into the story and were noticeably irrelevant (Brown & Smiley, 1977). Thus,
even though the kindergarteners differentiated these two classes of infor-
mation, there is no guarantee that they would be able to do so with
'"unrigged" stories.
Acknowledging the subjectivity of the previous assessments of importance,
Brown and Smiley (1977) adopted a more systematic method for determining
structural importance, developed by Johnson (1970). This method first re-
quires that a passage be divided into units that correspond to points at
which a speaker would pause. Next, raters are told that the units differ
in terms of their importance to the passage and that some of the units can
be eliminated without damaging the essence or "semantic cohesiveness" of
the text. Units are then classified into four levels of structural impor-
tance by first eliminating one quarter of the units judged to be least
important to the theme, then the quarter judged next least important, on
up to the most important. Although this method lacks a strong theoretical
rationale for either the initial parsing of the units or the subsequent
ratings, it is a relatively simple way to operationalize importance. Fur-
thermore, it yields a strong predictor of recall; Johnson found that the
higher a particular unit was rated in importance, the more likely its
recall by college students.
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Brown and Smiley (1977) used Johnson's method to determine whether
children's recall patterns were also sensitive to the four levels of
structural importance. The materials consisted of four non-Western fairy
tales of about fifth grade reading level, chosen for their unfamiliarity
to most American children. The fairy tales, parsed and rated by college
students, were presented on tape to children in third, fifth and seventh
grades and were then recalled. The structural importance ratings were a
strong predictor of recall: Important ideas were more likely to be recalled
than less important ideas and all four levels of importance were different
from each other in terms of amount recalled. Despite differences in total
recall, this same pattern was obtained for children of all three ages, as
well as college students. Of most interest was the finding that children
as young as eight years were sensitive to fairly subtle gradations in
importance. However, six year olds were not able to differentiate the
four levels of importance (Smiley, Oakley, Worthen, Campione, and Brown,
1977); although the most important ideas were best recalled, there were
no differences in recall of the three lower levels.
The studies discussed thus far suggest that young children recall more
of the important information in a passage than the unimportant. However,
they provide no indication that young children can actually identify the
main ideas of a text. It is possible that differential recall occurs for
reasons other than increased attention to important ideas during reading
or listening. For example, Brown and Smiley (1977) note that important
ideas are usually actions, whereas ideas of lesser importance tend to be
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static descriptions. Thus, better recall may result from better memory for
events and actions, rather than from identification of the important ele-
ments. It has been shown, in fact, that actions are generally better
recalled than static descriptions (e.g., Bartlett, 1932; Gomulicki, 1956).
In an effort to determine if children are consciously aware of the
differences in relative importance of information contained within a pas-
sage, Brown and Smiley (1977) asked students in third, fifth, and seventh
grades and college to perform the structural importance rating task. The
classifications were then compared to the original ratings done by college
students. Third graders were unsuccessful at differentiating levels; their
ratings were idiosyncratic, with most units receiving the full range of
scores. The fifth graders succeeded in separating the highest level from
the other three, which were not differentiated. Seventh graders had some-
what better discrimination: Levels I and 2 were differentiated, as were
levels 3 and 4, but levels 2 and 3 were not. Only the college students
differentiated all four levels.
Although these results suggest that third graders are unable to identify
even the most important elements in a passage, it should be noted that this
rating task is rather difficult. A number of factors may have contributed
to poor performance, among them the complexity of the material; the
stories were approximately two years beyond third grade reading level. If
the children were unable to comprehend parts of the text, we could hardly
expect them to be able to to rank the units for structural importance.
(This complexity undoubtedly contributed to the low recall scores obtained
by the third graders.) Furthermore, the units that the children were asked
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to rate were rather small, corresponding, for the most part, to phrases.
It is possible that the children would be more successful at differentiat-
ing levels of importance if they dealt with larger meaning units, where the
relationship of the part to the whole was more salient.
Bearing in mind that the children's performance would probably be better
if the task were simplified, it is interesting to compare the recall results
with the rating data. Brown and Smiley found that children from third grade
up showed differential recall of the four importance levels, yet not even
seventh graders were successful at classifying the units into four levels.
One way to account for this discrepancy is to assume that young children's
sensitivity to main ideas is below the level of awareness. In other words,
selective attention to important elements may be a relatively automatic
component of the comprehension process, while overt identification of these
elements requires more conscious evaluation of the material. Brown and
Smiley suggest this is a problem of "metacognition"; young children appear
to have limited knowledge about their own cognitive processes (Brown,
1975b, Flavell & Wellman, 1977).
It should be obvious that the importance rating task is not the sort
of task teachers would use if they wanted to find out if their students
could identify main ideas. Although such a task would be useful in
revealing whether students could construct a complete outline or effi-
ciently select items for further study, it is too complex to be a good test
of comprehension of main ideas. (And, indeed, Brown and Smiley did not
intend it to be.)
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A few experiments have used more straightforward methods of assessing
main idea identification skills, but these studies have a number of
weaknesses. In an early study, Mal'tseva (cited in Smirnov et al., 1971)
asked children in grades 2, 4, and 6 to compose an outline of a narrative
text, highlighting the most important information. The main ideas were
extracted by 46% of the children in second grade, 58% in fourth, and 65%
in sixth. With increasing age, then, children were better able to dis-
criminate the important from the unimportant. Otto, Barrett, and Koenke
(1969) had children identify the main idea in simple, 4-sentence passages.
Their instructions were to "make up just one sentence in your own words
that says what all the sentences (in the passage) tell you." Only 29% of
the second grade children were able to provide an adequate summary state-
ment; most added a considerable amount of detail. In a similar experiment
by Danner (1976), children from grades 2, 4, and 6 were asked to identify
"the one thing that the sentences in the paragraph tell you about." All
children correctly identified two-thirds of the main ideas, and 79% of
them identified all. Although older children were more successful, even
second graders performed well on this task.
These studies demonstrate that by the time children are in second
grade, they have some skill in identifying main ideas. However, the
childrens' abilities may actually be underestimated because of task vari-
ables. For example, the children may have been quite successful at extract-
ing main ideas, but they had difficulty producing sentences that adequately
expressed them. Moreover, the children may not have understood the rather
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cryptic instructions they received in the Otto et al. study. Danner opti-
mized his subjects' performance by giving them a number of orienting tasks,
but it is not clear that sufficient practice was provided in the other
experiments.
The research is also subject to a criticism raised earlier: There
were no explicit criteria for determining the relative importance of ideas.
The investigators presumably identified the main ideas themselves and scored
the responses for consistency with their subjective standards. Although
this is undoubtedly the approach taken by many teachers in evaluating their
students' answers, it would nonetheless be desirable to have more objective
criteria.
One additional factor to be considered in evaluating the main idea
research is that there may be developmental differences in the conception
of a main idea. Thus, although the responses did not conform to an adult
standard, they may have been consistent with the conception of a main
idea at a particular age. This suggestion has received support in a study
by Stein and Glenn (1978). Children in first and fifth grade were asked
to recall the three most important things that they remembered from a
story. The ratings were collected in a successive manner by asking for
the first most important thing in the story, the second, then the third.
Age differences were obtained in the types of information considered most
important. First graders generally focused on the consequences of actions,
while fifth graders focused more on the goals of characters in the story.
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These results suggest that first graders do have consistent ideas as to
what is most important in a story; their ideas just differ from older
children's ideas. What remains to be determined is the reason for the
developmental shift in importance judgments. One possibility is that the
meaning of importance undergoes changes. For example, older children may
regard information as important because it helps them organize and remem-
ber a text, whereas younger children may consider information important
because of its moral value. This is a highly speculative possibility; it
is clear that a more thorough investigation of the conception of importance
is needed.
In summary, it appears that children as young as five years of age
are sensitive to main ideas to the extent that they are more likely to
recall main ideas than details. However, it is not clear that this dif-
ferential recall arises from increased attention to the important elements
of the text. This is substantiated by the apparent difficulty young
children have in distinguishing important from unimportant information
and their less than perfect attempts to summarize main ideas.
Understanding Logical Structure
In addition to extracting main ideas from a passage, an important ele-
ment of comprehension is understanding how and why the ideas are inter-
connected. Skill at understanding the logical structure of a text is
firmly rooted in prior knowledge of the world. For example, if children
do not understand how two events in the physical world are logically related,
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we can hardly expect them to perceive this relationship in a text. It should
be noted that some of the studies to be reviewed in this section are not
explicitly focused on prose comprehension, but rather the comprehension of
logical and temporal relations. They are presented here because they deal
with what we believe is an important prerequisite of prose understanding.
Piaget (1926) is responsible for much of the recent interest in sensi-
tivity to logical structure. He reported that in retelling stories, young
children frequently mixed up the order of events and expressed causal con-
nections poorly or not at all. He attributed these problems to the child's
inability to make use of logical relations. However, the stories Piaget
used were lengthy and complex, and so perhaps were difficult to comprehend.
In an effort to clarify Piaget's claims, Brown carried out an exten-
sive program of research investigating children's comprehension and memory
for ordered sequences of events. (See Brown, 1976a, for a complete review.)
In one set of experiments, Brown and Murphy (1975) presented 4-year-old
children with sets of pictures that depicted either a logical sequence of
events or an arbitrary sequence. The logical pictures were arranged in
either normal or scrambled order. After presentation, the children were
asked to reconstruct the ordering of the pictures in each set. Reconstruc-
tion was better on ordered logical sequences than on arbitrary or scrambled
sequences. This indicates that the children understood the logical structure
of the pictures and were able to use their prior knowledge about logical
relations to improve memory. Another experiment demonstrated that the same
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set of unrelated pictures was better reconstructed when it was accompanied
by a narrative which meaningfully interrelated the pictures. Since the
pictures themselves were unrelated, the results cannot simply be attributed
to correct construction of the order on the basis of prior knowledge alone.
In a similar study, Brown (1975a) tested the hypothesis that the recall
failures reported by Piaget were due to excessive memory demands rather than
comprehension difficulties. Kindergarten and second graders were shown sets
of pictures accompanied by a logically structured or an arbitrarily sequenced
narrative. In a third condition, children were instructed to make up their
own story to help remember the pictures. After viewing the pictures, the
children were asked to recognize, reconstruct or recall the sequences. As
before, performance was worse when the narratives were arbitrarily ordered
than when they were logically connected. Moreover, the sequences which went
with the self-constructed stories were as well-remembered as the logically-
structured sequences. Second graders performed equally well on all memory
tasks, but for kindergarteners, recognition was better than reconstruction
which was in turn better than recall. Thus, the more external cues avail-
able, the better the performance. This study supports a point made earlier:
Recall difficulties do not necessarily reflect failures to comprehend,
Brown's experiments demonstrate quite convincingly that children as
young as four years of age understand logical relationships expressed either
verbally or pictorially. Moreover, the children are capable of capitaliz-
ing on these logical relationships to enhance their memory of the material,
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Thus, we have evidence that beginning readers possess the prerequisite skills
necessary for comprehending logical structure in prose. It has been shown,
in fact, that five year olds are very accurate in recalling the order of
events in short stories that are logically organized (Mandler & Johnson,
1977; Stein & Glenn, 1978).
It appears, however, that young children's comprehension is impaired
when the order that the events are presented does not conform to a logical
sequence. For example, French and Brown (1976) and Homzie and Gravitt (1976)
found that preschoolers had poorer comprehension of sentences in which the
order of mention was different from the order of occurrence, (i.e., "Before
Raggedy Ann calls the doctor, the dog bites the baby"). The disruption was
less detrimental when the events were logically rather than arbitrarily
related, indicating that the children perceived and benefitted from the
logical structure. That young children have difficulty dealing with in-
verted sequences is not necessarily an indication that they are deficient
in a critical comprehension skill. Adults, too, exhibit poorer memory of
inverted than forward-order sequences (Baker, in press; Clark & Clark, 1968).
Nevertheless, there appear to be developmental differences in children's
ability to deal with disruptions in logical structure. This is reflected
primarily in the strategies children use to impose a meaningful organization
on the material. For example, Poulson, Kintsch, Kintsch, and Premack (in
press) presented four-and six-year-old children with sets of 15 to 18
pictures that depicted a story. A non-memory method of assessing compre-
hension was used: Children were asked to describe the pictures one by one
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as they studied them (after having already viewed the complete set), and
their descriptions were compared with adults' descriptions. The pictures
were presented in either correct logical order or scrambled, in which case
it was extremely difficult for children to perceive the correct sequence.
Most of the descriptions children produced were responses to some
feature of the stimulus picture, but they also made responses that could
only be derived through an understanding of the story. Twice as many such
"story propositions" were produced when the story was intact, which is to
be expected since the scrambled pictures did not depict an obvious story.
However, many inappropriate story propositions were added in the descrip-
tions of the scrambled stories, indicating that the children were trying to
impose a logical structure on the picture set. Six-year-olds did this more
frequently than four-year-olds, and they used more inappropriate story propo-
sitions when the story was scrambled than they used appropriate propositions
when it was intact. Apparently, when the story was well structured, the
children felt it would be redundant to add story propositions, but when it
was scrambled, additions were needed in order to make the logical structure
more apparent. Thus, the six-year-olds seemed to be making up a story as
they described the scrambled pictures. In contrast, the younger children
frequently reverted to a strategy of labeling the pictures.
Stein (1976) also demonstrated developmental differences in the strate-
gies children use to deal with disruptions in logical structure. In addi-
tion, her experiment was a more sensitive test of children's understanding
of logical relations among events, in that she used prose stories with
subtle disruptions in logical order rather than picture stories with
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extreme disruptions. Starting with three logically ordered stories, she
systematically distorted them by moving specific statements away from their
points of origin. (These statements correspond to "categories" in story-
grammar terminology. Further details will be provided later in the chapter.)
In one case, the statement was simply inverted with its neighbor, while in
the other conditions, it was separated by more statements. Subjects in
second and sixth grades listened to the stories and then recalled them.
Although sixth graders recalled more information than second graders,
the general patterns of recall were similar. In general, the distorted
stories were more poorly recalled than the well-formed stories, with greater
effects the further the movement from the original position. Of most inter-
est were the types of reorganizational strategies children used when they
encountered a disruption. If the statement was simply inverted, subjects
tended to switch it back to its logical position. With larger movements,
children often repeated the statement; it was mentioned in the position in
which it was heard, but it was also mentioned in the position it should
appear. Thus, children remembered the position of the displacement, but they
repeated the statement and sometimes added new information to make the story
conform to a better structure. The older children were more successful than
the younger in reconciling the discrepancies.
In Stein's (1976) experiment, the stories were illogical when they were
temporally disorganized; there was nothing to alert the reader that the
events had been mentioned out of their proper story sequence. It is possible
that if the inversions were marked in the text, there would be fewer
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disruptions in recall. This was confirmed in an experiment by Stein and
Nezworski (1977); similar types of inversions were used, but markers such as
"This happened because ... " were included as signals that the order of
mention deviated from the order of occurrence. For fifth graders, marked
inversions were at least as well recalled as when the information appeared
in correct order, and some inversions were actually better recalled. For
first graders, some inversions were recalled as well as in well-formed
stories, but some were worse. This indicates that young children's compre-
hension is more dependent upon consistence with a forward-order logical
sequence than the older childrens'. First graders are probably less famil-
iar with temporal inversions as a stylistic device in stories and so are
less able to deal with them.
Similar conclusions were drawn by Mandler (1978). She constructed four
two-episode stories, and then violated the logical sequence by inter-
leaving statements from the two episodes. Each story began with a common
setting, followed by alternating statements from each episode. Subjects in
second, fourth and sixth grades, as well as college students, listened to
either normal or interleaved stories on tape and recalled them 24 hours
later. Not surprisingly, standard stories were better recalled than inter-
leaved. In recalling interleaved stories, subjects frequently repeated the
statements in their logical position was well as in their position of men-
tion, a strategy similar to that observed by Stein (1976). Children of all
ages were more likely to recall the interleaved stories in their logical
sequence than adults; they tended to separate the stories into discrete
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episodes, whereas the adults recalled the stories in their order of presen-
tation. Mandler attributes this reorganization to a lack of familiarity
with discrepant structures; in order to remember a story, children need to
make it conform to a logical sequence.
These studies have shown that children are sensitive to logical struc-
ture in stories, since deviations lead to decrements in recall. Furthermore,
it is clear that children begin to develop strategies for dealing with the
deviations by the time they are in first or second grade, as evidenced by
their attempts to reconstruct a logical sequence. Thus, these studies are
further evidence that skill at understanding how and why ideas are inter-
connected within a story develops very early, probably before the child
has begun to read.
Up to this point, our discussion has focused on children's sensitivity
to logical structure in picture and oral narratives. Awareness of logical
structure in expository prose is also an important concern, but few studies
deal with this type of text. Danner (1976), however, has carried out an
initial investigation. He constructed two short passages containing four
topics related to an overall theme. In the organized versions, each para-
graph dealt with one topic, while in the disorganized versions, each para-
graph contained sentences about different topics. Children in grades 2, 4,
and 6 listened to the taped passages and subsequently recalled them, with
each subject hearing an organized version of one passage and a disorganized
version of the second. The amount of text recalled was greater for the
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organized than the unorganized versions, and older children recalled more
than younger children. In the organized versions, all children tended
to group together those ideas that were related to a particular topic
sentence; however, developmental differences in grouping strategies were
observed with unorganized texts. Older children reorganized the state-
ments to conform to the logical, topical grouping, whereas younger children
did not.
After the recall task, the children were tested for their understand-
ing of logical organization: They were asked which passage was more dif-
ficult and why; they were asked to state the differences between the organi-
ized and disorganized passages; and they were asked to group a random arrange-
ment of sentences into their topical groupings. On all tasks, older chil-
dren performed better than younger children, suggesting differences in the
awareness of the organization that can be built into text material. For
example, all children reported that the disorganized passages were more dif-
ficult, but only the older children could show the experimenter how the two
passages differed or could actually state that one passage was "mixed up"
and the other in "the correct order." Furthermore, older children could
more easily group sentences in a passage around specific topic sentences.
Danner's results show an interesting parallel with Brown and Smiley's
(1977) findings. Whereas all children appeared to be sensitive to dis-
crepancies in logical structure as reflected by amount recalled, only the
older children were able to explain why the passages differed in diffi-
culty. Again, we see evidence of a metacognitive deficit. The results also
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invite the speculation that children develop an understanding of logical
structure in expository prose at a later age than they do in stories. This
could result because children are exposed to narratives from the time they
first begin to understand language, while experience with expository text
is infrequent before third grade.
In conclusion, comprehension of logical structure is an early-developing
skill. Children's knowledge about logical relationships and structure
greatly influences their memory for prose material. Those passages that are
organized according to an underlying logical structure are better remembered
than arbitrarily sequenced or disorganized passages. The studies reviewed,
however, illustrated that there are developmental differences in the skills
brought to these tasks. These differences seem to be related to children's
awareness that logical structure has a facilitative effect on memory.
Older children were more flexible and competent in using active strategies
to increase memory for disorganized material. An important area of future
investigation is the process by which this flexibility and awareness of
logical structure develops.
Making Inferences
In order to understand the main ideas of a text and perceive their
interrelationships, it is often necessary to bring in information that
is not explicitly presented in the text. Many of the things readers need
to know to comprehend prose are not explicitly stated; therefore, they
must be able to draw upon prior knowledge of the world to make inferences
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and fill in "gaps" in the flow of ideas. That comprehension involves an
interaction between the incoming information and what a person already
knows has been persuasively argued by Bartlett (1932). By providing
numerous examples of prose recall protocols, he demonstrated that meaning
is not inherent in a text but must be constructed by the reader, and so
may differ depending on experience, attitudes and context.
Bartlett's ideas have been influential in stimulating research on the
role of inferences in prose comprehension. Although most of the studies
have used adult subjects (see Bransford & McCarrell, 1975), developmental
psychologists have also become interested in the problem. Much of this
work has been reviewed thoroughly elsewhere (Paris, 1975; Paris & Lindauer;
1977; Trabasso & Nicholas, 1977), so our discussion will be relatively
brief.
We would like to note at the outset that the research on children's
inferencing skills leaves much to be desired. In many studies, it is not
clear that the children's performance can even be attributed to the use of
inferences. Moreover, the most commonly used experimental task is far
removed from normal reading situations. Nevertheless, the work deserves
mention, if only to show how many questions are still unanswered.
One of the most frequently tested hypotheses emerging from Bartlett's
(1932) work is that people construct an integrated semantic representa-
tion as they read or listen to prose and that as a result of this inte-
gration, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish the actual text con-
tent from inferred information. This hypothesis was tested developmentally
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by Paris and Carter (1973), after it received support in an adult study by
Bransford, Barclay, and Franks (1972). The materials in both experiments
consisted of sets of three related sentences, two premises and one filler.
An example is:
The bird is in the cage. (premise)
The cage is under the table. (premise)
The bird is yellow. (filler)
The two premise sentences allow one to infer the transitive relationship,
"The bird is under the table." Of critical interest is the extent to which
subjects falsely indicate that this true inference had been a member of the
acquisition set. In addition to the true inference, recognition items in-
cluded a true premise ("The bird is in the cage"); a false premise ("The
cage is over the table"); and a false inference ("The bird is on top of
the table").
In the Paris and Carter study, seven sets of sentences were read aloud
to children in second and fifth grades. After a 5-minute delay, the
children were given the recognition statements and were asked to decide
if they were exactly the same as those studied. Although second graders
made more errors than fifth graders, their response patterns were similar.
Children in both grades consistently made errors on true inferences; in
fact, they were as likely to identify true inferences as "old" as they
were to label true premises "old." The children were considerably more
accurate in labeling both false premises and false inferences as "new."
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These data led Paris and Carter to conclude that children, like adults,
construct the semantic relationships among ideas and integrate them in the
representation stored in memory; this creates difficulty discriminating
inferred from explicit information. Brown (1976b) and Paris and Mahoney
(1974) reported similar results using pictorial materials. In all studies,
the fact that even the youngest children had difficulty recognizing true
inferences as "new" was taken as evidence that the ability to make infer-
ences develops relatively early.
However, a number of factors cast doubt on the conclusion that the
children were in fact drawing inferences. For example, Trabasso and
Nicholas (1977) suggest that the children may have had a loose decision
criterion; that is, they said "old" whenever a statement was semantically
consistent, even if it could be discriminated from an actual premise. A
second problem arises from the fact that the false statements on the
recognition task introduced new relational terms while the true statements
retained the original terms (Trabasso & Nicholas, 1977; Thieman & Brown,
1977). Thus, it is possible that children falsely recognized true infer-
ences as "old" items because the relational term was the same and not
because they had made the appropriate inference. Some support for this
alternative explanation has been provided by Thieman and Brown (1977).
Finally, young children are notorious for their bias to respond "old" to
items on recognition tests. This bias is particularly a problem when the
data of primary interest are incorrect "old" responses.
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A recent study by Kail, Chi, Ingram, and Danner (1977) provides some-
what better evidence that children can and do make inferences. The earlier
paradigm was modified by having children decide if the test sentences were
consistent with, rather than identical to, the stories. This modification
eliminated reliance on false recognition errors as an index of inferencing,
since responses are correct if true inferences are classified as semantically
consistent. Materials were similar to those used by Paris and Carter (1973),
except that some of the 3-sentence stories allowed contextual, rather than
transitive, inferences. For example, "Mary was playing in a game. She
was hit by a bat" invites the inference, "Mary was playing baseball."
Children in second and sixth grades read the sentences aloud from slides,
controlling presentation times themselves. After the presentation of
each story, subjects received one premise and one inference question.
Children at both grade levels showed greater than chance accuracy on
all types of questions, and second graders were comparable to fourth. Of
most interest was the fact that subjects frequently judged true inferences
to be semantically consistent, while correctly judging false statements
inconsistent. Thus, this study strengthens the earlier claim that even
the younger children made inferences. Furthermore, it shows that they have
the ability to make "gap-filling" inferences; i.e., supplying the omitted
information that the game was baseball, as well as the "text-connecting"
inferences that establish intersentence relationships. It is much harder
to argue that the contextual inferences were simply an artifact of the
testing procedure.
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In all of the studies discussed thus far, the investigators concluded
that the inferences were made during initial exposure to the story and
stored in memory along with the explicit information. However, it is
possible that inferences were not made until the time of test, prompted
by the recognition statements. Thus, the data do not indicate that children
made inferences during reading but simply that they can make inferences.
Of course, knowing that children can make inferences at all is really of
most importance. Besides, children should not be encouraged to make all
possible inferences as they read, but only those which are necessary. It
is not clear that they must make the transitive inference, "The bird is
under the table," in order to understand "The bird is in the cage. The
cage is under the table."
In view of the limitations of his earlier work, Paris (Paris & Upton,
1976) provided a more sensitive test of children's ability to draw infer-
ences from prose. The materials consisted of passages that were seven or
eight sentences in length, as opposed to the simple sentence or picture
sets used previously. The passages described behaviors and incidents
familiar to young children (e.g., raiding the cookie jar). Eight yes/no
probe questions were constructed for each passage, half of which required
inferences and half tested memory for verbatim information. The required
inferences were of two basic types: those that could be made from single
lexical items, (e.g., inferring that scissors were used to cut some paper),
and those that depended on contextual relations within and between sen-
tences (e.g., inferring that a child who tried to help a wounded bird liked to
take care of animals).
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Subjects were children in grades K-5, who listened to each story as
it was read aloud and then answered the eight questions. The older chil-
dren made more correct responses than younger children on both verbatim and
inferential questions, but the difference was greater on inferences.
Further analysis of the data revealed that the developmental improvement
in making contextual inferences was not simply due to better memory of the
stories (although the lexical inference improvement was). This result led
Paris and Upton to conclude that childrens' inference-making skills do
improve with age, contrary to Paris' earlier conclusion (Paris & Carter,
1973).
A second experiment by Paris and Upton (1976) examined the relation-
ship of performance on the probe task to a subsequent test of free recall.
Recall accuracy correlated highly with the ability to draw contextual infer-
ences at each grade level, and this correlation increased with age. The
authors concluded that inferencing enhances recall and that the older the
child, the more recall is improved. Although this conclusion is intriguing,
it should be regarded as tentative: The correlation does not indicate that
inferencing caused improved recall, but simply that the two were somehow
related.
A few recent studies have provided perhaps the most unambiguous evidence
that young children can draw inferences from prose material. These studies
have all used a questioning technique specifically designed to elicit infer-
ences. Brown, Smiley, Day, Townsend and Lawton (1977) presented children
in second, fourth, and sixth grades with passages that could be interpreted
with respect to a previously-provided framework. A series of probe questions
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indicated that the children had accessed information from the orienting
framework to aid in the comprehension of the story. (See Levin, this volume,
for a more thorough discussion of the study.) Stein and Glenn (1978) and
Omanson, Warren, and Trabasso (1978) also found that young children could
draw inferences from stories. Although the inferences were not always
those an older child or adult would have made,it was clear that the chil-
dren accessed their previous knowledge in dealing with the new material.
In summary, despite weaknesses in many of the experiments we reviewed,
the available evidence is sufficiently compelling to conclude that children
can and do make inferences about prose material, calling upon their general
knowledge of the world to supplement explicit information. Several issues
remain to be clarified, however, such as children's awareness of the infer-
ence process, the conditions under which inferences are made, and whether
or not inferences influence memory.
Using Higher-order Knowledge Structures
Throughout this chapter, we have argued that comprehension involves
an interaction between the reader's background knowledge and the text itself.
Prior knowledge plays a crucial role in all of the skills we have discussed:
extracting main ideas, understanding logical structure, and drawing infer-
ences. When using these skills, specific knowledge may be brought to bear
on particular segments of text; for example, we access our knowledge about
tools that can be used for cutting paper to infer that "scissor" was the
implied instrument in the sentence "She cut the paper." Situations also
arise where more generic knowledge can be used to enhance comprehension.
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For example, people have generalized knowledge about stories,with specific
expectations about their structural components. Similarly, people often
have general knowledge about the structure of reading materials specific
to their field, i.e., journal articles. Such organized collections of
knowledge are known as "higher order" knowledge structures or "schemata."
Schemata are thought to facilitate comprehension because they can be used
as an organizing framework within which to integrate incoming information.
(See Anderson, 1977, & Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977, for further discussion of
the role of schemata in comprehension.)
Within the past few years, several investigators have attempted to
describe the higher order structures that are used to encode, represent,
and retrieve information in stories. Attention has focused on the story
because of the regularity in its underlying logical structure. That is,
despite variations in content, linguists have observed a stable organiza-
tional pattern governing the types of information and logical relations
that exist in most stories (e.g., Colby & Cole, 1973: Levi-Strauss, 1955;
Prince, 1973; Propp, 1958). Whereas linguists have been concerned primarily
with the structure of the stories per se, psychologists have been more
interested in the knowledge people have about the structure of stories.
This knowledge has been described in a number of different grammars for
stories (handler & Johnson, 1977; Rumelhart, 1975; Stein & Glenn, 1978;
Thorndyke, 1977). Despite some differences in terminology and degree of
elaboration, the major characteristics of the grammars are similar. The
Stein and Glenn (1978) grammar will be summarized here for illustrative
purposes.
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Table I provides an example of a simple story that has been partitioned
into categories, the basic units of analysis in the Stein and Glenn (1978)
grammar. The story is considered well-formed because it contains all of
the requisite categories, arranged in their correct logical sequence. A
simple story can first be broken down into two parts: a setting category
plus an episode structure. The setting begins the story with the intro-
duction of a protagonist and normally includes information about the social,
physical or temporal context of the story. The episode is the primary
higher order unit of analysis and consists of five categories of informa-
tion. These categories serve particular functions in the story and occur
in fixed temporal sequence. The initiating event category contains an event
or action that changes the story environment. The major function of this
change is to evoke the formation of a goal. The goal is included in the
internal response category. Internal responses also include affective
states and cognitions, and they serve to motivate a character's subsequent
overt behavior. Overt actions that are directed towards goal attainment
are classified as attempts. The result of an attempt is the consequence,
which marks the attainment or non-attainment of a goal. The final category
is the reaction, which can include either a character's response to the
consequence or broader consequences of the goal attainment.
In reality, few stories have a structure as simple as the one des-
cribed; most stories contain many episodes, and these may be connected by
various types of logical relations. Similarly, stories may also contain
incomplete episodes, where one or more of the basic categories is omitted.
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In such cases, it is assumed that the reader infers the information con-
tained in the missing category. However, if too many categories are missing,
and/or the logical connections are vague, people will not be able to con-
struct an adequate representation of the story. Such stories are not con-
sidered 'well formed."
This brief description of a story grammar is admittedly over-simplified
due to space limitations. The main point we want to convey is that.there
are rules governing the kinds of information that should appear in a story
and the order in which this information appears.
A number of recent experiments have tested predictions about story com-
prehension and memory based on the grammars (e.g., Glenn, 1978; Mandler,
1978; Mandler & Johnson, 1977; Rumelhart, 1975; Stein, 1976; Stein &
Glenn, 1977a, b, 1978; Stein & Nezworksi, in press; Thorndyke, 1977).
This work is discussed in detail in Stein (in press) and the interested
reader is referred to that source. One of the major conclusions that has
emerged is that knowledge of the structure of stories is critical to an
understanding of stories. Therefore, it is important to study the develop-
ment of this knowledge and its role in children's comprehension.
A straightforward way to assess children's knowledge of story structure
is to ask them to produce a story. If they do have knowledge about the kinds
of information that belong in stories, then this information should appear
in their constructions. Stein and Glenn (1977a) provided kindergarten,
third, and fifth graders with story settings and asked them to finish the
stories. The children's stories were classified according to their
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structure, which ranged from simple descriptions through complex episodes.
The more sophisticated structures were characterized by their inclusion of
purposive behaviors and increasingly well-specified motives and goals.
Only about half of the kindergartners' stories contained purposive behaviors,
while two thirds of the third graders' stories were purposive, as were
almost all of the fifth graders'. Thus, there was a clear developmental
progression in the logical complexity of the stories, presumably reflecting
increasing knowledge of the constituents of a well-formed story.
Leondar (1977) also found a strong relationship between age and the
structural complexity of stories produced by children ranging in age from
3 to 16. Similarly, Sutton-Smith and his colleagues (Botvin & Sutton-Smith,
1977; Sutton-Smith, Botvin, & Mahoney,1976) reported high correlations
between age and several hypothesized levels of structural complexity in
the stories constructed by children from 3 to 12 years of age. Although
all of the investigators used different indices of structural complexity,
they observed strikingly similar developmental patterns. Perhaps of most
importance is the common observation that children as young as four and
five years of age were capable of constructing well-formed, purposive
stories. This finding conflicts with Piaget's (1926) claim that children
lack the cognitive structures to produce a coherent story before the age
of seven or eight. All of these experiments suggest that children acquire
knowledge about story structure at a very early age and use it to guide
their story construction.
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The extent to which such knowledge influences comprehension and memory
of stories has also been investigated. The basic paradigm is to present
children with short stories and ask for recall. The primary focus is on
qualitative aspects of recall, rather than quantitative; in other words,
researchers are more concerned with the kinds of information children re-
member from stories than the overall amount. Stein and Glenn (1978) pre-
sented first and fifth graders with children's stories that had been analyzed
according to their grammar. The older children recalled more than the
younger, but recall of specific statements was stable over grades. Some
categories were more salient to the children than others, as indicated by
their frequency of recall. Major settings were best recalled, closely
followed by initiating events and consequences. Internal responses were
poorly recalled, except when they contained goal statements. The only
consistent developmental difference was that fifth graders recalled more
internal responses than first graders. This parallels the increasing
emphasis on motivations reflected in children's story construction and
importance ratings (Stein & Glenn, 1978). [We should point out that this
trend is not specific to stories, but appears in children's understanding
of many types of social interactions (Flappan, 1968).]
Stein and Glenn (1978) also examined information that had not been
contained in the original stories but was introduced in recall. More
intrusions were made by fifth graders than first, and the intrusions fre-
quently belonged to the internal responses and attempt categories. The
fact that internal responses were poorly recalled would lead one to believe
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that children are insensitive to psychological states of the characters;
however, the high proportion of internal response intrusions indicates
that this is not so. In fact, a second experiment by Stein and Glenn (1978)
directly probed children's perceptions of causality in the stories, and
showed that all children regarded a character's intentions and motivations
as the primary cause of the consequence. Responses to a series of "why"
questions revealed that even the first graders had good comprehension of
the logical relationships existing among the story categories.
Mandler and Johnson (1977) also examined qualitative aspects of story
recall using four short stories analyzed according to their grammar (Stein
and Glenn's terminology will be used here since it has already been intro-
duced). Children in the first and fourth grades, and college adults,
listened to and recalled the stories. Adults recalled more information
than fourth graders, who in turn recalled more than first. Age differ-
ences were observed in the amount recalled from specific categories, but
the patterning of recall was similar. Settings were best recalled by the
first graders, closely followed by initiating events and then consequences.
Recall was progressively worse for attempts, reactions, and internal
responses. Fourth graders had the same ordering of category recall
except that attempts were as well recalled as consequences. Adults
recalled attempts, settings, initiating events, and consequences equally
well, but reactions and internal responses were still significantly worse.
These commonalities suggest that young children are sensitive to the same
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structural components in stories as adults. The results are consistent
with those of Stein and Glenn (1978) in showing differential recall of
specific categories. It appears that story grammar analyses can predict
what information will be remembered on the basis of its structural role
in the story.
A major prediction derived from story grammar analyses is that stories
which conform to the prototypical structure will be better remembered than
those that do not. Stein and Glenn (1977b) tested this hypothesis by exam-
ining the effects of category deletions on children's story recall. They
constructed four stories that contained all six categories specified by
their grammar and created five variations by deleting one category from the
episode. Children in first and fifth grades listened to and recalled either
well-formed stories or their structural variants. Fifth graders recalled
more than first, but in general, the category deletions did not have the
anticipated disruptive effects on recall. However, for both grades, recall
was disrupted when the initiating event of the story was deleted, and first
graders showed decreased recall when the consequence was deleted.
An analysis of the intrusions in recall proved informative. Fifth
graders made more inferences than first graders except when the stories
were well formed or when the reaction was deleted. There were more infe,-
ences relative to the well-formed story when the initiating event, attempt
or consequence was deleted, but no increases with deletions of the internal
response or reaction. It is interesting to note that it is when the most
frequently recalled categories (initiating events and consequences) are
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deleted that most new information is added to recall. Similarly, the
deletions of these categories produced the largest decrement in accurate
recall. The added information was often of the same category type as that
which was deleted; that is, if an initiating event was deleted, children
would infer one; if a consequence was deleted, a new one would be inferred.,
This study provides further evidence that young children do have knowledge
of story structure and that they use that knowledge to make deviant stories
conform to the norm. Nevertheless, developmental differences were apparent
in the skill with which gap-filling inferences could be made.
A related prediction of story grammars is that comprehension and/or
memory will be impaired if the presentation order of a story violates the
protypical sequence of categories. Since a disruption in category sequence
produces a disruption in the logical flow of ideas, it is intuitively clear
that this prediction would be supported by empirical test. In fact, we have
already described the studies which have been undertaken as specific tests
of this hypothesis in the section on logical structure (Mandler, 1978, Stein,
1976, Stein & Nezworski, 1977). To reiterate, these studies demonstrated
that young children are sensitive to disruptions in story sequence, as
reflected by decrements in recall and attempts to reorganize the story
to conform to a more logical structure.
In summary, it appears that knowledge about the structure of stories
develops during the preschool years. Most children's exposure to stories
begins before they can even talk, so it is not surprising that a story
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schema is acquired quite early. The schema goes through refinement during
the elementary school years, with an increasing focus on internal goals
and responses. Several studies have provided evidence that children, as
well as adults, benefit from the organizing framework of the story schema.
Story grammars have been constructed to describe the schema and are useful
as an approach towards understanding the comprehension process. The grammars
offer a model of the strategies people might use when reading or listening
to a story that enable them to encode information efficiently.
Conclusions:
What Can Researchers Tell Educators that they Don't Already Know?
As we cautioned at the beginning of the chapter, the relevance of
many of these experiments to comprehension instruction is far from obvious;
nevertheless, we claimed they were of practical significance. We will
now defend this claim, but at the same time point out the limitations of
the research and directions for further study.
It is undoubtedly true that many of the experiments we reviewed
simply confirmed what reading teachers have always known: under the right
conditions, young elementary school children can identify main ideas,
understand logical structure, make inferences, and use knowledge about
the structure of stories. Perhaps teachers would feel gratified to know
that their intuitions and classroom observations have been supported
experimentally, but they would probably prefer to be told something new.
Since the new information provided by these experiments lies primarily in
their implications, it will be helpful to make these implications explicit.
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Of the skills we discussed, the one most directly relevant to compre-
hension instruction is main idea identification. The experiments showed
that regardless of age, children have better memory for important than
unimportant information in a passage. As we noted, however, recall does
not necessarily reflect an ability to identify main ideas. The best way
to find out if children can identify main ideas is to ask them directly,
ideally with the text available to minimize memory demands. Although
Brown and Smiley's (1977) importance ratings were obtained in such a way,
the task complexity undoubtedly led to a low estimate of children's abili-
ties. Using a much simpler task, Danner (1976) found that second graders
could identify main ideas with some success. However, the passages he used
were so short and simple that the older children may have found them
insultingly easy. (This problem can arise whenever there is a large age
range among subjects; materials that are the right level of complexity for
one age group may not be appropriate for another.) Thus, we do not have much
data on older children's main idea indentification skills with more chal-
lenging passages. Moreover we do not know how skill at identifying main
ideas changes with age.
We do know that there are developmental differences in the types of
information children judge to be most important in stories (Stein & Glenn,
1978). There are undoubtedly individual and cultural differences as well,
since everyone comes to the reading situation with different background
experiences. However, the nature of the educational process requires that
such differences be ironed out, for students are expected to extract the
main ideas from their textbooks. Just how children learn to identify this
normatively important information remains to be investigated.
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The research on children's understanding of logical structure has
fewer parallels in educational practice than the main idea research.
Although children are often asked to unscramble pictures or sentences to
create a logical story, there is little attention devoted to teaching how
and why ideas within a passage are interconnected.
One reason for this lack of direct instruction may be that teachers
feel children already understand logical relationships by the time they
start to read. The research we reviewed demonstrates that preschoolers
are, in fact, sensitive to logical structure in oral and picture narratives.
The primary developmental difference in understanding logical structure
seems to be in the strategies that are available for dealing with dis-
organized passages (Poulson et al., in press; Stein, 1976; Stein &
Nezworski, 1977; Mandler, 1978). Although we don't really know how these
strategies develop, experience alone must be an important factor.
In view of the increasingly dominant role of expository texts in
the child's educational experience, further research on understanding
expository text organization is needed. Although Danner's contribution is
important, additional studies should extend his work using more complex
materials. Such research would be valuable not only for comprehension
instruction, but also for instruction in writing; children must under-
stand logical organization in order to write logically organized prose.
The research we reviewed on inferences provides us with little more
than the conclusion that children can draw inferences when asked questions
about sentence triplets and simple stories. The extent to which children
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spontaneously draw inferences remains an empirical question, although there
is some evidence that children will infer information that is crucial to
comprehension (Brown et al., 1977; Stein & Glenn, 1978).
Given the methodological problems inherent in the inference research,
the following generalizations should be regarded as tentative. There seems
to be no evidence of developmental change in children's abilities to make
inferences from sentence or picture triplets (Paris & Carter, 1973; Paris &
Mahoney, 1974; Kail et al., 1977). However, there were developmental dif-
ferences in making inferences from stories. Paris and Upton (1976) reported
that older children were better at making contextual inferences than
younger, and Stein and Glenn (1978) reported age differences in children's
ability to infer missing elements in a story. These discrepant findings
may result from differences in the scope of the required inferences. That
is, inferences based on the sentence sets could be made by considering two
simple sentences, whereas with stories, inferences often dealt with the theme
of the story as a whole. Thus, younger children may have had difficulty
considering the many components of a story simultaneously; this conclusion
is supported by the fact that when the inferences dealt with specific words
and phrases from a story, the developmental differences were eliminated
(Brown et al., 1977; Paris & Upton, 1976).
An important comprehension skill that we did not touch upon in our
review of the literature, but which is related to inferencing, is the ability
to consider new material in light of what is already known. Little or no
research has focused on this higher level aspect of comprehension (which some
do not consider to be comprehension per se, but rather applying the products
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to formulate and are rather subjective. Nevertheless, this skill is crucial
in answering "application" and "integration" questions frequently encountered
on tests. Since even college students have difficulty with such questions,
it is unlikely that young children consider incoming information with regard
to a broader context of experience. By focusing too much on typical memory
tests of learning and comprehension, such as free recall and recognition,
educators run the risk of restricting student's intellectual creativity.
Every teacher, for example, has probably encountered students who knew their
course material by heart but failed a test because they were required to do
come creative, integrative thinking. (See Baker & Santa, 1977, and Baker,
Santa & Gentry, 1977, for empirical demonstrations of this phenomenon.)
Though the necessity for such "transsituational" comprehension increases as
children become more involved in studying for content courses, it is
probably never too early to introduce training in this skill.
The research dealing with children's understanding of story structure
showed that children do in fact know what kinds of information belong in
stories. Even four- and five-year-olds are capable of constructing well-
formed stories that include purposive behavior. The research shows that
young children have excellent comprehension of stories that conform to the
structure specified by the schema. However, their comprehension is impaired
when stories deviate from the schema, and this impairment is greater than
that which occurs for older children and adults. One source of this devel-
opmental difference is less familiarity with discrepant structures. Clearly,
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repeated experience with such stories allows one to build up strategies for
dealing with them.
An important practical application of this research is to use the story
grammar as a model for construction of instructional materials. Many of the
materials currently prepared for beginning readers are sometimes little more
than strings of sentences, lacking the conflicts and goals that are such
crucial elements of stories (Bruce, 1978). It's no wonder, then, that many
children regard reading as a boring task and not worth the effort. However,
if stories were constructed to conform to a story schema, not only would the
children find them more comprehensible, but hopefully they would discover
that reading can be intrinsically rewarding.
While it is important for beginning readers to enjoy reading, it is
also important that they learn to read expository prose, a task that is
usually not nearly as much fun as reading a good story. Virtually all of
the experiments on prose comprehension development have used stories as
stimulus materials. One reason for this focus is to maintain children's
interest in the task, but the primary advantage of using stories is that
their structures can be specified by story grammar analysis. Nevertheless,
researchers must also investigate expository comprehension, particularly in
children of the "transitional" period; i.e., third and fourth graders who
have mastered basic decoding skills but are not yet fluent readers. It is
often at this time that reading problems become apparent, both because of the
shift in emphasis from decoding to comprehension and because the children are
expected to deal with expository prose in their social studies and science
books for the first time.
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Although there are undoubtedly many commonalities underlying comprehen-
sion of stories and expositions, there are also many differences which should
be explored. We know that children understand stories quite well at an early
age, yet we do not know how well they understand expository prose. It is
possible we would find something akin to what Piaget (1952) has termed a
"horizontal decalage": a particular child may be quite capable of performing
a certain mental operation (i.e., making an inference) with a story but not
with an expository text. Similarly, as we suggested earlier, children may
understand logical structure in narrative before expository text. A number
of factors may contribute to this hypothesized decalage, the most obvious
of which is the child's greater experience with stories. In addition,
stories have a higher order structure specified by cultural conventions,
while expository text structures are more variable and ill-defined. Thus,
children can use their story schema to enhance their story comprehension;
no such generic knowledge is available for expository prose. Finally,
stories are more concrete, with events and characters that the child can
identify with, through experience or imagination. Expository material,
on the other hand, is typically abstract, dealing with unfamiliar concepts
and situations. In summary, since understanding is highly dependent on
prior knowledge and experience, we should expect to find that young children
have better comprehension of narrative than expository prose.
Our conclusion will conclude with a brief introduction to a new area
of investigation, alluded to previously, that has important implications for
educators: metacognition. Metacognition refers to the knowledge or awareness
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people have about congitive processes (e.g., memory, attention, comprehension,
communication). A number of experiments have shown that young children
are deficient in a variety of metacognitive skills (Brown, 1975, and in press;
Flavell, 1978; Flavell & Wellman, 1977). For example, we noted previously
that children seem to lack metacognitive knowledge about importance and
logical organization (Brown & Smiley, 1977; Danner, 1976). But of more direct
consequence to comprehension instruction is the growing evidence that young
children have poor "metacomprehension" skills; that is, they do not always
know when they don't understand. A recent study by Markman (1977) provides
a good demonstration of this phenomenon. Children in grades 1-3 were given
instructions on how to play a game or perform a magic trick. In both cases,
informationwas left out that was critical to being able to follow the
instructions. After listening to the instructions, the children were asked
a series of questions designed to get them to indicate that they didn't
understand. The children were told that their help was needed in coming up
with good instructions, and that they should let the experimenter know if
something was omitted or wasn't clear.
The older children asked questions much more readily than the younger,
realizing that the instructions were incomplete. It was often not until the
first graders actually tried to carry out the instructions that they realized
they didn't understand. Markman concluded that this metacomprehension
failure occurred because first graders did not execute the instructions mentally
as they listened to them. Although their passive listening may have given them
a feeling of understanding, because they didn't actively evaluate whether the
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instructions made sense, they didn't know they didn't understand. In this
experiment, then, children as young as third grade showed good metacompre-
hension. However, when the task demands are more complex, even college
students are not very good at monitoring their comprehension (Baker, 1978).
These data suggest that keeping track of the state of one's compre-
hension during reading may be crucial to comprehension. This implies that
poor comprehenders may benefit from metacomprehension training. Further-
more, it suggests that rather than wait until remediation is necessary,
efforts should be made to teach metacomprehension skills in parallel with
comprehension skills. At present, it seems that teachers do much of the
metacognitive work for children (Wertsch, in press); the burden should be
shifted to the children themselves. Further research should reveal that
increasing children's awareness of their ongoing comprehension processes
will enhance their comprehension skills.
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Table 1
Category Breakdown of a Well-formed Story
Setting I .
2.
Initiating
Event
Internal
Response
Attempt
Consequence
Reaction
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Once there was a big grey fish named Albert
who lived in a big icy pond near the edge of a forest
One day, Albert was swimming around the pond
when he spotted a big juicy worm on top of the water
Albert knew how delicious worms tasted
and wanted to eat that one for his dinner
So he swam very close to the worm
and bit into him
Suddenly, Albert was pulled through the water into a boat
He had been caught by a fisherman
11. Albert felt sad
12. and wished he had been more careful
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